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Abstract
In this thesis, I analyze contagious effects stemming from Greece to Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Italy, and Turkey during the Greek sovereign debt crisis. Using the VAR framework,
I estimate adjusted cross-market correlation coefficients, and then test them on con-
tagion. My research is based on examination of 10-year sovereign bonds and stock
market indices in time period spanning from December 2004 to August 2012. The
thesis finds that contagious impacts arising from the Greek crisis were present in all
the examined countries. I also find significant interdependence among some of the
examined countries. The existence of transmission channels suggests that the crisis
could spread easily from Greece.
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V této práci se zabývám vlivem finančńı nákazy š́ı̌ŕıćı se z Řecka v době řecké dluhové
krize do následuj́ıćıch zemı́: Bulharska, Kypru, Itálie a Turecka. Pomoćı upravených
korelačńıch koeficient̊u źıskaných z VAR modelu se snaž́ım odhalit nákazu do výše
zmı́něných zemı́. K výzkumu použ́ıvám 10leté vladńı dluhopisy a akciové indexy v
obdob́ı od prosince 2004 do srpna 2012. Tato bakalářská práce odhaluje š́ı̌reńı nákazy
zp̊usobené řeckou dlouhovou kriźı do všech zkoumaných zemı́. Analýza ukazuje, že
existuje velmi silná vzájemná závislost mezi některými zkoumanými trhy. Existence
přenosových kanal̊u naznačuje, že krize se z Řecka mohla š́ı̌rit jednoduše.
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Bachelor Thesis Proposal
In 2010, it became evident that Greece was experiencing serious financial problems
and had to ask for international help. Greek government officials asked for a bailout
in order to prevent default on its government debts. The EC, the ECB, and the
IMF have provided bailout plans, which have been supplying Greece with hundreds
of billions euros, and hundreds of billions euros of its loans were written off. Still
after such an enormous international help, the Greek economy has been recovering
very slowly. Overall unemployment rate is around 25 %, and unemployment among
age group of 15-24 is around unbelievable 55 %. From 2008 to 2012, its nominal
GDP felt almost by 30 %.
The aim of my thesis will be to examine the impact of the Greek economic meltdown
on its neighboring economies with the focus on financial contagion. I will investigate,
if financial contagion occurred in all the examined countries, why occurred, and how
strongly occurred. Also, I will look into, in which sectors of economy occurred.
Hypotheses
1. Contagion occurred in all the neighboring countries (i.e., Albania, Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Italy, Macedonia, and Turkey).
2. Contagion was stronger in the EMU member countries.
3. Contagion occurred only in the financial sector, the non-financial one was in-
tact.
Methodology
I will work with the term “financial contagion” as it is defined by Forbes & Rigobon
(2002). For testing hypotheses, I will use the VAR model introduced by Forbes &
Rigobon (2002). For testing first two hypotheses, I will use daily data from 2003 to
2012 on 10Y government bonds. For the third hypothesis, I will use daily data from
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Greek sovereign debt crisis began in late 2009, and since then, it has been
affecting whole the EU and mainly the eurozone. Risk perception of the European
countries quickly changed, driving yields of some sovereign bonds incredibly high.
Several countries had to even seek external help to be able to repay their liabilities
and to refinance their debts. Even the Greek economy represented only ca. 2,6 %
of the eurozone’s GDP at its brightest periods, it has caused serious troubles to all
European leaders.
Because of the severe economic turmoil, which has been happening in Greece,
many have feared that contagion could spread from Greece to other countries, even-
tually infecting the eurozone and consequently the whole EU. Thus extensive re-
search has been done on possible spread of contagion from Greece to the eurozone
countries. But almost none research has been conducted on contagious capacity of
the Greek meltdown to its neighboring countries. When having such a crumbling
economy as the neighboring one, it is not very likely to pass the critic period intact.
My thesis targets such topic.
I focus on contagious effects to the neighboring countries, how strong they are,
and what the main determinants for magnitude of contagion are. For measuring
contagion, I use one of the most common methods, which was firstly introduced by
Forbes & Rigobon (2002). It is based on comparison of the correlation coefficients
obtained from the VAR framework. For my estimation method, I use yields on
10-year government bonds, because it can be seen as a proxy for risk perception
of a country in the long term. The riskier investment, the higher yield demanded.
If there are contagious effects from Greece, sovereign yields should correlate with
the Greek ones significantly more than before the crisis started. I also use stock
market data to distinguish any impact of the Greek crisis on the financial and the
non-financial sector in terms of contagion.
The remainder of the thesis is structured in the following way: Background,
Literature review, Data & Model, Results, and Conclusion.
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The second part, Background, gives a look at the overall situation around Greece.
The third part firstly summarizes theoretical literature and secondly empirical one.
The fourth part introduces the data used for this research and describes the employed
model in detail. The fifth part reports results obtained from the model and analyzes
them. The sixth part summarizes and concludes the thesis.
Chapter 2
Background
This part is divided into two sections. In the first section, I provide the reader
with a basic overview of the development of the Greek crisis. I also briefly discuss
tools introduced to firstly stop the spreading of the crisis, and secondly to help the
Greece to get out of it. In the second section, I provide some basic figures about
the Greek economy to complete the whole picture about the Greek government-debt
crisis.
2.1 Situation development
Since the beginning of the Greek crisis, the EU and the ECB have introduced
many extraordinary measures to prevent the crisis from spreading out of Greece,
and to preclude any possibility of contagion. In 2010, the EU introduced the EFSF
and the EFSM. The EFSF was merged with the ESM in 2012 and was capable
of financing up to e440 billion. The ESM is capable of financing another e500
billion. These funds have been put together in order to bring confidence back to the
market and to convince investors that the EU, hence the eurozone, is strong and
can prevent member countries from default. Nevertheless, these facilities were not
enough to calm the investors down, leaving the interest rates on government bonds
too high for some countries. Therefore in May 2010, the ECB launched the SMP
– a program for purchasing sovereign bonds in secondary markets of countries in
need aiming to lower interest rates of concerned bonds. The SMP was running from
May 10, 2010, until September 6, 20121. Liquidity provided by the SMP is sterilized
through fine-tuning operations such as auctions of fixed-term deposits. So it should
not affect monetary policy (Panico & Purificato 2013). Although lawfulness of this
program is questionable, together with stability mechanisms, it has succeeded in
1On September 6, 2012, the SMP was replaced by the OMT. Since the OMT has not been used
yet and has not directly influenced the bond yields, it is not in the scope of this thesis.
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calming the situation. All troubled countries, except of Greece, have the access on
the bond market.
These measures only aimed to stop the panic and to stop possible spreading
of contagion from Greece; nevertheless, it did not aim to help Greece directly. To
help Greece to stand on its own feet again, a broader consensus had to be reached.
The fact that Greece had bigger problems, which was not able to solve on its own,
became apparent in the fourth quarter of 2009. In April 2009, Greece estimated that
its debt-to-GDP ratio for the year would be 99,6 %. Nevertheless in November 2009,
Greece changed the figure to 126,8 %, after international pressure questioning verity
of such data. Greece had to also adjust other figures such as budget deficit. Adjusted
budget deficit for 2009 soared to 12,7 % of GDP. Such adjustments together with
uncertainty about accuracy of the rest of the Greek data stood at the beginning of
the Greek crisis.
On May 2, 2010, the EC, the ECB, and the IMF, together known as Troika,
introduced a bailout plan of e110 billion (e80-billion finance support provided by
the eurozone countries on a bilateral basis, e30 billion provided by the IMF as a
stand-by arrangement), which aimed to help Greece to cover its financial needs for
period May 2010 – June 2013. The program was conditional on passing needed
structural reforms to increase productivity, implementing austerity measures, and
on privatization of governmental assets of value e50 billion by the end of 2015. e80
billion provided by the eurozone countries were later reduced by e2,7 billion for
two reasons. Firstly, Ireland and Portugal did not contribute because they were
experiencing severe economic conditions and were forced to request financial sup-
port themselves. Secondly, the Slovak parliament refused to contribute the required
amount of e800 million for political reasons.
Another wave of financial support was agreed upon in March 2012, when Troika
approved additional e130-billion support for period 2012 – 2014 on grounds of wors-
ened economic conditions. Anticipated financial aid totaled e165 billion until De-
cember 31, 2014, of which e140 billion was financed through the EFSF, and the
rest was granted by the IMF. Again, release of the funds was conditional on passing
economic reforms and fulfilling economic criteria2.
Moreover, Troika with Greek political leaders forced private creditors to accept
inferior debt conditions – a face-value cut off of 53,5 %, longer maturity, and lower
interest rates. Nevertheless already in the 4Q 2012, Troika approved condition
softening of the second-wave support such as lower interest rates and maturity ex-
tensions; furthermore, the IMF granted additional e8,2 billion to Greece due to –
2see detailed in Council Decision 2011/734/EU of 12 July 2011 (as amended in November 2011,
13 March and 4 December 2012) and the Memorandum of Understanding setting the economic
policy conditionality (with the last update signed on 7 December 2012)
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yet again – worsened economic conditions.
The program was running without major issues, and the Greek problem seemed
to be dealt with until parliamentary snap election in January 2015. The opposition
party Syriza won the election and since then has been trying to re-arrange the terms
and conditions of the program. The Greek situation is again uncertain.
2.2 Overview of the Greek economy 2000-2014
The Greek economy has never exceeded more than 3 % of the eurozone in terms
of nominal GDP. According to Eurostat, it reached its peak in 2008 at value ca.
e242 billion (for comparison the Czech GDP at that time was ca. e161 billion,
and in 2014, the Greek economy was still larger than the Czech one). Since then,
it has lost more than 26 % (comp.: Czech -3,75 %). However, GDP per capita is at
the same levels as it was in 2000; this surely does not sound so badly as the 26%
drop in GDP. Nevertheless due to the sharp decline of GDP, debt-to-GDP ratio has
changed dramatically. It reaches almost 180 %, which is extremely high; still, the
debt alone is not the reason, why the Greek economy is not able to operate on its
own. Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio is around ca. 220 %, Italian is around ca. 130 %,
and U.S. around ca. 120 %. All mentioned countries have serious problems with
their debts, but unlike Greece, they do not need billion-euro support as described
above.
The main cause, why Greece needs external help, is that its economy is very
inefficient and has very low productivity. Greece suffers from massive corruption
and tax evasion; it has also very large public sector (Bouvet et al. 2013). Corruption
with large public sector contributes to low effectiveness, and tax evasion again with
large public sector puts great pressure on public finances. Resulting indebtedness
is just the outcome of poor economic efficiency; debt alone could not cause such a
large-scale crisis. This is the reason, why financial help from Troika is conditional
on structural reforms, and why Troika gives such importance to it.
To put my words to some perspective, I provide the reader with several figures.
Unemployment has remained above 25 % for more than 2 years, reaching its peak
27,9 % in the 3Q 2013. Since 2009, Greek GDP has been declining. Import dropped
by one third. Even though the Greek path has been drastic for more than 6 years
now, it seems that it is somehow stabilizing. If you look at the figures, unemployment
has been mildly declining for more than a year, year-to-year changes in GDP are
heading to zero from such depth as -8 %, and overall export seems to be in a good
condition relative to its past development.
Chapter 3
Literature review
Literature regarding contagion has one unique characteristic – no unequivocal
definition of contagion. This phenomenon is discussed in the first section of this
part. Following sections sum up theoretical frameworks and approaches used for
detecting contagion. This part concludes with a summary of the recent research
about the European sovereign debt crisis.
3.1 Definition of the term contagion
There is not a clear agreement about the definition of financial contagion. Pericoli
& Sbracia (2001) identify five the most commonly used definitions at that time:
1. “Contagion is a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in one country,
conditional on a crisis occurring in another country.”
2. “Contagion occurs when volatility spills over from the crisis country to the
financial markets of other countries.”
3. “Contagion is a significant increase in co-movements of prices and quantities
across markets, conditional on a crisis occurring in one market or group of
markets.”
4. “Contagion occurs when the transmission channel is different after a shock in
one market.”
5. “Contagion occurs when co-movements cannot be explained by fundamentals.”
(Pericoli & Sbracia 2001, p.9)
Since then, the view on contagion has changed. Second definition does not
exclude a possibility of interdependence. According to Forbes & Rigobon (2002),
interdependence can be defined as: “strong linkages between the two economies that
8
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exist in all states of the world” and “the co-movement [between the two markets]
does not increase significantly [after a shock to one of the economies]” (Forbes &
Rigobon 2002, p.2224). In another words, when magnitude of the co-movement re-
mains unchanged or the change can be explained by other external factors, it is not
contagion. In the second definition, the increased volatility could be explained by
e.g. similar fundamentals; in the majority of the recent papers, this is not considered
as contagion. All other definitions exclude interdependence. At first sight, it might
appear that the first and the third definition may include also interdependence, but
the difference is in the word “significant”; that is such increase that cannot be ex-
plained by rational means. The fourth definition represents “structural” view on
contagion. That is: contagion occurs, when the structure of the way, how move-
ments in one economy are transmitted to the other economy, is altered.
Philippas & Siriopoulos (2013) group definitions of contagion into three types:
1. The wake-up-call contagion – “Contagion in which the crisis initially restricted
to one country, providing new information that prompts investors to reassess
the default risk of other countries.”
2. The shift contagion – “The normal cross-market channel intensifies after a
crisis in one country with an increased sensitivity to global risk factors instead
of country-specific factors.”
3. The pure contagion – “Any instance of contagion that is completely unrelated
to the level of fundamentals.”
(Philippas & Siriopoulos 2013, p.162)
So-called the wake-up-call contagion (also referred as the wake-up-call effect) is
not perceived as contagion in many papers referring to the European sovereign debt
crisis and will not be understood as contagion in this thesis as well. The wake-up-call
effect is rather a rational re-assessment of facts. Some facts might be assigned with
greater or lower importance due to various reasons, and after a shock to at least
one country, the level of importance is reasonably adjusted for better corresponding
with the new state of the world. It differs greatly from all other definitions, because
this type of contagion does not exclude a possibility of explanation solely based on
rational behavior. Thus I do not consider it as contagion.
To see how differently a definition of contagion can be constructed, I pick three
of them from the recent papers. Kaminsky et al. (2003) define contagion as “an
episode in which there are significant immediate effects in a number of countries
following an event – that is, when consequences are fast and furious and evolve over
a matter of hours or days” (Kaminsky et al. 2003, p.3). Gorea & Radev (2014)
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construct the following definition: “an increase in a joint probability of default after
a shock to one country” (Gorea & Radev 2014, p.78). Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero
(2014) use the following definition: “an abnormal increase in the number or in the
intensity of causal relationships, compared with that of tranquil period, triggered
after an endogenously detected shock” (Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero 2014, p.14).
The unclear concept of contagion makes sometimes difficult to compare various
papers on contagion. The definition used greatly influences the result of a paper.
It is beneficial to use one of the more frequent definitions for the sake of better
comparability with existing research. One of the most influencing and cited works
on contagion was conducted by Forbes & Rigobon (2002). Thus in this thesis, I use
their definition – “a significant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one
country (or group of countries)” (Forbes & Rigobon 2002, p.2223).
Use of this definition is wise for several reasons. It clearly rules out a possibility
of interdependence. It fulfills the concept of contagion as I understand it: a change
in relationships between two markets, which cannot be solely explained by funda-
mentals, i.e. some kind of irrational behavior is involved in influencing the process.
And finally, it fits well with the method used in this thesis for detecting possible
contagion – the method will be discussed in more detail in the part 4.
3.2 Estimating methods
When estimating contagious effects, there are several ways how to tackle the
problem. Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) summarize the most common meth-
ods in their paper. They list following ones: probability analysis, cross-market
correlations, VAR models, latent factor/(G)ARCH models, and extreme value/co-
exceedance/jump approach.
To expand the list above, I add some other techniques used: copula functions,
co-integration technique, extreme value theory approach, and granger causality.
Forbes & Rigobon (2002) declare that “[the methodology of cross-market cor-
relation coefficients] is the most straightforward approach to test for contagion”
(Forbes & Rigobon 2002, p.2227). Indisputable advantage of the model introduced
by Forbes & Rigobon (2002) is in its simplicity. It compares correlation coefficients
during two periods; if the correlation coefficients from the post-shock period show
significant increase in comparison with the pre-shock coefficients, then it can be
concluded that contagion occurred.
Nevertheless, it has several drawbacks. Correlation coefficients capture only lin-
ear dependence between variables (Stove et al. 2014). If the relationship is not
linear, the measurement is inaccurate. Favero & Giavazzi (2002) states that many
country-specific shocks have non-linear impacts on other countries. Moreover, cor-
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relation is not invariant of non-linear transformations. Further, it prioritizes the
central part of the distribution and disregards extreme values (Rocco 2011). This is
not a good property, when examining contagion, because it is a phenomenon that
occurs after extreme events. Methods based on correlation coefficients presume that
examined data follow the Gaussian distribution (Pais & Stork 2011). According to
Rocco (2011) financial time series have often heavy tails.
Moreover, a sample under examination must be divided into two sub-samples. It
must be done arbitrarily and before actual testing. As it is stated above, the analysis
is based on comparing two periods – a tranquil period and a crisis period. For such
comparison a break point, where the tranquil period ends and the crisis period
begins, must be picked. Also, presence of such tranquil period is a necessity for this
method. Thus to be able to examine contagious effects of a shock, researchers must
be able to collect enough data prior the shock. The two periods are distinguished by
different volatilities. In the stable period, volatility is low; after a shock, volatility
often rises, and turmoil period is characterized by high level of volatility compared
to the stable period.
Correlation-coefficient analysis suffers from heteroskedasticity issue. As stated
by Forbes & Rigobon (2002) “Cross-market correlation coefficients are conditional
on market volatility” (Forbes & Rigobon 2002, p.2225). Since volatility is often
dependent on time, heteroskedasticity is present, thus correlation coefficients are
biased and inaccurate without proper adjustments – discussed in more detail in the
part 4.
Drawbacks of the correlation coefficients can be among the reasons, why EVT
has gained popularity in recent years. It examines tail events and disregards others.
By the definition, extreme events are rather rare and large in magnitude (Rocco
2011), after these events contagion may arise. Since EVT focuses on such events,
the approach seems very suitable for examination of contagious effects. According
to Pais & Stork (2011) “EVT is particularly well-suited to analyze extreme negative
events represented by large decreases in stock prices and how they propagate across
institutions and sectors” (Pais & Stork 2011, p.683). Nevertheless, very high number
of observations is needed, and threshold defining extreme values must be picked
carefully, otherwise it can lead to misleading results. When employed with copula
functions, it is able to detect different patterns of dependence, and it can determine
causality. When non-parametric form of EVT is employed, no assumptions has to
be made about the probability distribution of the variables (Aloui et al. 2011).
Another very popular method employed, when estimating contagion, is GARCH
framework, because it removes the problem with heteroskedasticity. The paper
written by Grammatikos & Vermeulen (2012) states clearly: “the GARCH model is
well known for its ability to deal with time varying stock market volatility” (Gram-
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matikos & Vermeulen 2012, p.518). Nevertheless, it has its own shortcoming. Forbes
& Rigobon (2002) declare that GARCH framework does not explicitly test for conta-
gion. Pechova (2010) also comes to a similar conclusion: “[GARCH] is not primarily
focused on detection of contagion” (Pechova 2010, p.20). Although GARCH itself is
not suitable for detecting contagion, when put together with other estimating tools,
it is very helpful. For instance, GARCH is used in the DCC model introduced by
Engle (2002). According to Pragidis & Chionis (2014), the advantage of the DCC-
GARCH model is that researchers do not need to divide the sample into the two
sub-samples.
According to Forbes & Rigobon (2002), Granger-causality approach is often used
when the source of contagion is not obvious, or when issues with endogeneity arise.
This method is able to detect feedbacks from the infected countries to the source
country.
GARCH, correlation coefficients, and Granger causality are the most widespread
methods employed regarding research about the European sovereign debt crisis.
There have been some new methods introduced such as A-DCC model or copula
functions, but they have not been in wide use yet, given their novelty.
3.3 Contagion propagation mechanisms
There are many ways, how contagion can spread. Bouvet et al. (2013) state that
it can propagate through trade linkages and international capital markets. Conta-
gion through trade linkages may happen, when firms from one country experience a
shock, thus may be unable to repay its obligations to their trading partners abroad.
This would lead to lower tax revenues and other possible negative effects in the
foreign economy, and therefore worsening fiscal balance, hence impairing ability to
repay sovereign debt. The other way of spreading contagion could be explained in the
following way: when country’s debt is downgraded, some financial institutions (do-
mestic and foreign) may be force to dispose such debt instruments in order to meet
financial-regulation requirements. This disposal can lead to increase in sovereign
bond yield and possible further downgrading. The financial institutions may then
lack sufficient collateral or capital volumes. Governments may then need to step in
and inject additional capital into those institutions. Similarly to the example above,
such actions may affect fiscal balance of such countries and impair ability to finance
their debt.
Given high level of integration in the eurozone, many banks outside of a troubled
country may hold its debt. This suggests that issues from one country can spread
quickly to the whole eurozone. Pragidis & Chionis (2014) add to these two mech-
anisms also “similarities in macro fundamentals, liquidity, and irrational behavior
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of investors” (Pragidis & Chionis 2014, p.3). Similar macro fundamentals usually
cause only the wake-up-call effect, which may not be considered as contagion – see
the section 3.1.
Contagion via liquidity means that when a financial institution realizes losses due
to toxic financial instruments, it may find itself cut from further funding, because
investors may exhibit fly-to-quality pattern. Even if the institutions are not cut
from external funding, it can cause serious troubles. When bonds lose their value,
it lowers an amount of collateral available to the institutions, therefore it directly
affects their functioning.
3.4 Empirical literature
The majority of the papers tends to the conclusion that there was no (or very
limited) contagion spreading from Greece.
For instance, Pragidis & Chionis (2014) find no contagion from the Greek 10Y
government bonds to the sovereign bonds of the following countries: Portugal, Ire-
land, Spain, Italy, Germany, and France. They use Forbes’s & Rigobon’s (2002)
correlation coefficients and DCC methodology. For the first methodology, they de-
fine the crisis period from October 20, 2009, to March 16, 2012. Not even that they
find no contagion, they find that correlation coefficients decreased among countries
suggesting that investors began looking more closely on each country’s macro fun-
damentals and economic indicators. Furthermore, they discover flight-to-quality
pattern among German and French bonds.
This conclusion is in line with Bhanot et al. (2012), who also find no evidence of
contagion to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain using VAR and ARCH frameworks.
The paper also suggests that correlation coefficients actually decreased during the
crisis. Their definition of the turmoil period is from July 2007 to March 2011.
Claeys & Vasicek (2014) test for contagion 16 EU countries finding only very
limited contagion. They claim that contagion occurred only when financial assis-
tance to troubled economies – Greece, Ireland, and Portugal – was discussed at EU
level. Besides that, no contagion was present. They employ FAVAR framework.
Samitas & Tsakalos (2013) test for contagion using A-DCC model and copula
functions. They find that a limited contagion occurred mainly among Italy, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain. Nevertheless, the most of contagion is probably caused by
the wake-up-call effect. The paper does not state clearly its definition of contagion,
therefore it is not obvious, what they mean as they are referring to contagion. All of
the detected so-called contagion could be probably explained by the fundamentals.
Although they are in a minority, there exist papers suggesting that contagion
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from Greece occurred. For instance, Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2011) test1 for con-
tagion using OLS-HAC (OLS adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation)
and find evidence that contagion was spreading from Greece in period March 2009
– February 2010. Moreover, they claim that in period March 2010 – August 2011
contagion had several sources: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) identify “clear evidence of contagion” (Gomez-
Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero 2014, p.1) among 11 eurozone countries2. They use Granger-
causality approach to identify new connections and to detect intensification of exist-
ing ones. The authors find that contagion did not spread only among the peripheral2
countries, but it was also spreading to the core2 countries. This study does not se-
lect a break point between tranquil and turmoil period a priori based on researchers’
knowledge; instead, they run Quandt-Andrews test to detect them. Since their in-
terest is the whole eurozone, not just Greece, I state only relevant break points for
my purpose: November 2009 – admission made by Greek authorities of questionable
adjustments of public-finance statistics; later in that month correction of such data
followed; and April 2010 – Greece made a request for international support.
Philippas & Siriopoulos (2013) also confirm the hypothesis of spreading conta-
gion from Greece to other countries3. Similarly to Gomez-Puig & Sosvilla-Rivero
(2014), they do not set a break point purely exogenously. With help of Markov
switching model, they identify December 2009 as the break point. Unlike the ma-
jority of papers, they do not base their computations directly on daily data of 10Y
government bond yields, but they base it on “the average weekly realized volatility”
(Philippas & Siriopoulos 2013, p.167) of these instruments.
Bouvet et al. (2013) find evidence of contagion in the following way: when Greek
(and Spanish) sovereign spreads4 increased, it significantly affected other countries’5
debt-to-GDP ratios. They use panel VAR framework for such testing; defining the
pre-crisis period from 2000 to 2007 and the crisis one as 2008 – 2011.
Definitions of turmoil periods differ among papers. Some papers define the be-
ginning of the period somewhere around the collapse of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers; other somewhere at the end of 2009, when the Greek issues became evi-
dent. This may also have an effect on the results presented in the papers.
It is worth mentioning also papers, which do not base their examination on gov-
1They performed the tests on 10 eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Germany is not among the countries, since
they use 10Y sovereign bonds yield spreads relative to Germany.
2core countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands; peripheral coun-
tries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
3France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands
4Sovereign spread is defined as a difference between country’s 10Y bond yield and yield on U.S.
treasury notes
5Countries under examination: eleven founding countries of the eurozone
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ernment bonds. For instance, Mink & de Haan (2013) employ event study approach
to analyze the relationship between news about Greece and the Greek bailout on
the one hand and 48 European bank6 stock prices in 2010 on the other hand. They
conclude that the possibility of the Greek default was not considered as a serious
source of contagion by international investors. Still, news about the Greek economic
situation and about the Greek bailout had impact on government bonds of Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain. The offered explanation by the authors is the wake-up-call
effect, therefore supporting hypothesis of no contagion as it is defined in this thesis.
Another conclusion, published in the paper, is that news about the Greek bailout
had significant effect on all bank stock prices, no matter how large the exposure
to Greece was. This suggests contagious effects spreading from Greece to other
European countries.
Kalbaska & Gatkowski (2012) use CDS spreads instead of sovereign bonds. They
test for contagion among GIIPS7, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Al-
though the paper is more focused on examination of contagion during the global
financial crisis of 2007-08, it also touches early stages of the European sovereign
debt crisis8. It reveals that Greece had actually the lowest triggering capacity of
contagion after the first Greek bailout – May 2010. The authors’ explanation is that
“it became obvious that the Greek crisis is the European Union crisis” (Kalbaska
& Gatkowski 2012, p.671), therefore attention moved to the core countries – mainly
Germany and France, since they had the biggest decision power regarding the Greek
crisis; also their economies are significantly larger and more important for the whole
continent. For these reasons, they had much higher capacity of triggering contagion
than Greece had.
Gorea & Radev (2014) also examine the European contagion phenomenon based
on CDS spreads. They find that contagious effects through financial channel were
present only among the eurozone periphery countries9, while contagion via trade
linkages spread also to the core countries9, though in a very limited way.
6Banks under examination are from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom
7Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain
8The period under examination ends in September 2010 – approximately a year after the be-
ginning of the Greek crisis
9core countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Malta; periphery countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Chapter 4
Data & Model
This part is divided into three sections. In the first one, I briefly discuss the
motivation behind countries picked for my research together with introduction of my
main variables. The second section analyzes the data and the estimation technique
in detail. The third one focuses on sensitivity analysis of the model.
4.1 Data
Since Greece is a coastal country, it may be ambiguous, what by neighboring
countries is meant. In this thesis, I analyze Greek relationships with following
countries: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Italy, and Turkey. Obviously, I pick Bulgaria and
Turkey, because they share land border with Greece. Although Cyprus does not
have land borders with Greece, it is very connected to it. Greece is the main import
and export partner for Cyprus, therefore any shock experienced in Greece may be
well transmitted to Cyprus. Italy is included in my research for following reasons:
its distance from Greece is less than 200 kilometers, it has been the largest import
partner of the sample countries for Greece for many years, and it was the main export
partner until 2012, when Turkey took the lead. Furthermore, it has many similar
macro-economic indicators such as: high level of debt-to-GDP ratio, high public
expenditures, high unemployment – mainly among the youth, high bank exposition
to the domestic debt, poor tax collection, and instable political environment. The
last reason is comparability; whether the thesis belongs to the group, which rejects
contagion to Italy, or if it belongs to the other group.
Moreover, it adds one more perspective, how to look at the presented results.
There are two cases, in which the Italian results would have greater information
value. If the model rejects contagion for Italy, but detects contagion for other ex-
amined countries, the results with contagion will have greater weight in comparison
to the case, when contagion is detected for all countries including Italy; similarly,
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when it confirms contagion for Italy, but rejects contagion for others, the soundness
of rejection would be stronger compared to the case, when contagion is rejected for
all.
Albania and Macedonia are excluded from the examination, despite they both
share land border with Greece. The data available on these two countries are not
sufficient for my research. Examination of the impact of the crisis on these two
countries may be the focus of a next research using different estimating methods
and requiring different type of data.
I use daily data on 10Y government bond yields for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece,
Italy, and Turkey. Data are acquired from several sources. All data on 10Y gov-
ernment bond yields, but Turkish, are acquired from Eurostat. Bloomberg serves
as the source for Turkish government bonds. All other data come from Thomas
Reuters Eikon, unless indicated differently. Time period under examination begins
on December 17, 2004, and ends on August 10, 2012. For Cyprus, the examined
period is adjusted and begins from January 11, 2008. Cyprus became a member
of the eurozone on January 1, 2008, therefore to avoid any influences arising from
such transition, I alter the period. Similarly, the examined period for Turkish bonds
begins also on January 11, 2008. I found no data on Turkish 10Y government bonds
in 2007, therefore I have to begin my research from January 2008. Discussion about
time-period selection follows in the section 4.2.
I also examine stock indices in daily frequency of such countries. I use the same
time period for comparison with results based on sovereign bonds. I compare impacts
of the Greek crisis on whole stock markets and on the bank stocks separately. As
it is stated in the section 3.3, banking sector is one of the transmission channels of
contagion. Thus such contagion may be stronger and may be better detectable on
bank indices than on government bonds or on indices representing whole markets.
From my examination, I have to drop two variables. The first one is bank stock
index for Bulgaria because of its non-existence. The second one is Cypriot 10Y
government bond yield. Eurostat reports only primary market yield for Cyprus. The
effective yield is fixed to the latest sovereign bond issuance and its yield, therefore
this indicator has the exactly same value for long periods of time. Such property
makes this variable unsuitable for my testing. The development of the variable is
depicted in Figure 4.1 for illustration. Thus I do not test my hypotheses on Cypriot
bonds and Bulgarian bank stock index.
CHAPTER 4. DATA & MODEL 18
Figure 4.1: Cypriot 10Y sovereign bond yield
Financial data often follow a unit root process; to test for this possibility, I
run an ADF test. The test does not exclude the possibility of a unit root existence,
therefore transformation of the data is needed. I apply the following transformation:






(Pragidis & Chionis 2014). After the transformation, the test strongly rejects unit
root and the data are stationary. The transformation turned the data on bond yields
into rate of returns of bond yields and the data on stock indices into stock returns.
4.2 Introducing the model
I test the following three hypotheses:
1. Contagion did not occur in all the examined countries.
2. Contagion was not stronger in the eurozone countries.
3. Contagion occurred only in the financial sector, the non-financial one was
intact.
I employ the methodology introduced by Forbes & Rigobon (2002) with several
adjustments based on latter literature. As it is stated in the section 3.2, Forbes’s &
Rigobon’s (2002) methodology is one of the most straightforward methods, how to
test for contagion. It is well-known and often used. The problem with heteroskedas-
ticity is dealt with well as it is shown below in this section. Secondly, I have enough
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data to establish both a stable and a turmoil period, so the necessity of existence
of the stable period is not an issue here. Thirdly, I can set a break point to divide
the sample into the stable and the turmoil period easily, since there exists sufficient
amount of literature identifying such point. I am aware that only linear depen-
dencies can be revealed by the model. Still, the existing literature on the Greek
sovereign debt crisis exploit heavily methods connected with correlation coefficients.
I contribute to the existing research by examining countries, which have not been
under examination yet.
Forbes’s & Rigobon’s (2002) approach compares cross-market correlation coeffi-
cients, which are acquired from the VAR model. The VAR framework, which I use,
has the following structure:
Xt = φ(L)Xt + Φ(L)It + ηt (4.2)
Xt = {xjt}′ (4.3)







, where xGt is rate of returns of the Greek government bond yields in time t in the
first part, and return of the selected Greek stock index in time t in the second part
of the estimation. xjt is the same indicator for country j.
φ(L) and Φ(L) are vectors of lags. iGt is the short-term interest rate in Greece.
As Greece has been a member of the eurozone, since January 1, 2001, I use Eonia for
this purpose. As defined by the ECB (2015): “It is calculated as a weighted average
of the interest rates on unsecured overnight lending transactions denominated in
euro”.
ijt is the same indicator for country j. For Italy and Cyprus, it would be again
Eonia, thus ijt is not present in the model for these two countries. For Bulgaria and
Turkey, it is Leonia and TRLIBOR, respectively. Leonia is the same as Eonia, but
regarding Bulgarian Lev. It is sponsored by the Bulgarian central bank and several
other institutions. TRLIBOR1 is sponsored by the Banks Association of Turkey. I
use its overnight values, therefore it can be thought as the Turkish equivalent to
Eonia and Leonia. For the variable iust , I use the federal funds effective rate, which
in its logic is similar to the Eonia rate.
zV IXt is the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Market Volatility Index.
As it is defined by CBOE (2015) “a key measure of market expectations of near-term
volatility conveyed by S&P 500 stock index option prices”.
Since the ADF test does not reject the hypothesis of a unit root presence, I trans-
form all the variables according to the above mentioned formula 4.1. All variables
1data on TRLIBOR acquired from www.trlibor.org; the web page is run by the Banks Associ-
ation of Turkey
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and their transformations are depicted in Appendix A.
The motivation behind employing interest rates and volatility index in my model
is following. Interest rates control for changes in monetary policy (Claeys & Vasicek
2014) and for aggregate shocks to an economy (Forbes & Rigobon 2002), which both
can influence the bond yields. VIX is used as a proxy for fundamentals (Bhanot
et al. 2012). As stated by Claeys & Vasicek (2014), VIX “is often used to measure
risk aversion on global markets” (Claeys & Vasicek 2014, p.15). It can be thought
that interest rates control for fundamentals on a regional level and VIX controls
for fundamentals on the global one. Some papers use VSTOXX instead of VIX
(European variation of VIX) – for instance Pragidis & Chionis (2014). However, I
think, VIX is a better choice, since VSTOXX could suffer from possible endogeneity
as it measures volatility on European stock markets.
zECBt is a dummy variable. It controls for effects arising from interventions on
bond markets conducted by the ECB through the SMP – as stated in the section
2.1. For periods of high activity of the SMP, zECBt = 1; when the SMP is inactive
or the activity is low, zECBt = 0. Periods of high activity are following: May 10,
2010, – June 6, 2010, (total amount purchased2: e28,5 billion; weekly average: e5,7
billion); September 27, 2010, - October 1, 2010, (T: e1,4 billion; W: e1,4 billion);
November 1, 2010, - February 21, 2011, (T: e16,5 billion W: e1,1 billion); August
8, 2011, - January 23, 2011, (T: e145 billion W: e6 billion). The highest amount of
bonds held by the SMP was e219,5 billion; purchases in the defined high-activity
periods constitute more than 87 % of the amount. The impact of the SMP on
the Greek bond yields is confirmed by e.g., Eser & Schwaab (2013), Trebesch &
Zettelmeyer (2014).
ηt is a vector of reduced-form disturbances. Xt and It are transpose vectors of
the variables.
To account for the fact that exchanges have different opening hours, moreover
that some variables come from the U.S. market, I compute 2-day moving averages
of the variables. I also adjust the data for non-trading days; since they differ among
exchanges, the number of observations is not identical for individual datasets. All
variables are thought to be exogenous. Only xjt is thought to be endogenous; based
on literature review, 4 lags of xjt should be sufficient to capture any effect.
One of the main issues to solve is heteroskedasticity. Methodology introduced
by Forbes & Rigobon (2002) removes such issue. They firstly estimate conditional
correlation coefficients – coefficients, which are biased, when heteroskedasticity is
present – then they estimate impact of heteroskedasticity and correct for it deriving
unconditional coefficients.
2at market price, not face value
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Their argumentation is following. The authors come with simple model
yt = α + βxt + εt,
, where
E[εt] = 0,
E[ε2t ] = c <∞
E[xt, εt] = 0.
They prove that with increasing variance in x, the estimated correlation coefficient
between x and y increases as well, even if the real correlation remains constant.
Thus correlation coefficient is conditional on volatility (Forbes & Rigobon 2002).






as an expression of the relative increase in the variance of x. Forbes & Rigobon
(2002) propose the unconditional correlation coefficient in this way:
ρ =
ρ∗√
1 + δ[1− (ρ∗)2]
.
To come to this coefficient, two strong assumptions have to be made. First one
is no endogeneity, the second one is no omitted variable (Forbes & Rigobon 2002).
I have dealt with both of the assumptions. It is almost unanimously accepted
that the Greek sovereign debt crisis originated in Greece (inter alia, Bouvet et al.
(2013), Arghyrou & Kontonikas (2011), Philippas & Siriopoulos (2013) and has
had the strongest impact on the country (inter alia, Samitas & Tsakalos (2013),
Grammatikos & Vermeulen (2012), so feedback (if any) from the neighboring coun-
tries should be negligible. Therefore I can allow xGt to be exogenous variable. Any
other effect should be covered by variables for interest rates, by the variable for the
volatility index, and by the dummy variable.
Nevertheless, the unconditional coefficients as proposed by Forbes & Rigobon
(2002) are under criticism that they are biased towards rejecting contagion (e.g.
Pragidis & Chionis (2014). I construct correlation coefficients as they are stated
in Pechova (2010). The author modifies the construction of the coefficient slightly,
which lowers the bias. The adjustments are in the definition of δ and in a restatement
of the null hypothesis. New definition of δ is:





Forbes & Rigobon (2002) in their hypotheses compare the conditional coefficient
for a whole period with the unconditional one for a crisis period. I compare the
conditional coefficient for a stable period and the unconditional one for the crisis
period. There can be the conditional coefficient used in the hypothesis, since it is
assumed that the stable period is a period of low volatility, and the crisis period
is a period of high volatility, thus there is no need to adjust the coefficient for the







, where upper index * indicates conditional coefficients, and lower indices “s” and
“t” indicate the stable and the crisis period, respectively.
In another words, the null hypothesis says that no contagion occurred after
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As stated in the section 4.1, the examined period spans from January 11, 2008,
to August 10, 2012, for Cyprus and for Turkish bonds. For the rest of the countries,
the period begins from December 17, 2004, and ends also on August 10, 2012. The
beginning for the second group is chosen arbitrarily well enough before the beginning
of the Greek crisis. When examining the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the majority of
papers agrees that the crisis began at the end of 2009. As my brake point, I choose
November 13, 2009. In that time, the real Greek figures about its economy became
public and Greek bond yield started to rise. The development of the Greek 10Y
sovereign bond yield is shown in Figure 4.2 for illustration. I also pick the end date
of the crisis period – August 10, 2012, even though the data are available further
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beyond this point. The yield after that date dramatically fell, indicating that severe
crisis period was calming down, so any ability to create contagion decreased.
Figure 4.2: Greek 10Y sovereign bond yield
To sum up: the tranquil period spans from December 17, 2004, (January 11,
2008, for Cyprus and Turkish bonds) to November 13, 2009. The turmoil period is
from November 16, 2009, to August 10, 2012.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
I run a set of sensitivity tests to see whether changes in model specification have
significant effect on reported results. For instance, varying number of lags from 1 to
4, dropping variables for interest rates, VIX, and the dummy variable, or changing
dates for beginnings and endings of the stable and the turmoil period.
The alternative beginning date of the stable period is set to match the beginning
date for the analysis of Cyprus and Turkish bonds, i.e. January 11, 2008. I pick
May 2, 2010, as the alternative breakpoint date. As discussed above, there were two
major events at the early stages of the Greek crisis – first one occurring in November
2009, and the second one occurring in May 2010. I work with November 13, 2009,
as my primary date and May 2, 2010, as the alternative date. The alternative end
date of the turmoil period is set to October 25, 2013, more than one year after my
primary end date. Rate of returns of the Greek bond yields (tGR10) remain still
quite volatile after the primary end date – see Figure 4.3, therefore from this point
of view, the alternative end date suits better than the primary one.
I assume that the alternative beginning date of the stable period should not have
significant effect on the final results. It is included in the primary stable period – a
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period of low variance and no shocks, therefore shortening the stable period should
not affect results, because the nature of the period does not change significantly.
Nevertheless, the alternative dates regarding the turmoil period may have an
impact on the results. As depicted in Figure 4.3, behavior of tGR10 is changing
dramatically throughout the turmoil period, therefore when I include or exclude
some part of it, such action may influence results. Regardless the length of the
turmoil period, its nature is still quite different from any of the stable ones. There
are some basic characteristics about the periods presented in Table 4.1. Notice
that standard deviations differ greatly between stable and crisis periods no matter
on picked dates. P and A denote primary and alternative dates, respectively. S
denotes a stable period and T denotes a turmoil one.
However, our result should be stable enough not to change after dropping some
variables, or when different number of lags is utilized.
Figure 4.3: Rate of returns of Greek 10Y sovereign bond yields
Table 4.1: Basic characteristics of different periods of tGR10
Chapter 5
Results
In this part, I present results of the model as described by formulae (4.2) – (4.4).
I analyze results of each of the countries in a separate section, and then provide
details about robustness check, thus 5 sections follow in this part.
In each section, I present tables of results. Notation is the same for all tables.
Conditional correlation coefficients have upper index *, coefficients for stable period
have lower index “s”, and the ones for turmoil period have lower index “t”. σ
denotes standard deviation of the variable tGR10, tGRx, or tGRb depending on
the instrument under examination – 10Y sovereign bonds, all stock indices, bank
stock indices, respectively. I use σ as a proxy for market volatility. FR1 and FR2
values for rejecting the null hypothesis (no contagion) at various confidence levels
are stated in Table 5.1. The values for FR1 and FR2 are the same, since number
of observation is well above 100. The null hypothesis at a specific level is rejected,
when both of the FR statistics are higher than the corresponding value. When FR
statistics give contradicting verdicts, the situation is treated individually.
Table 5.1: Values for FR statistics
From now on, if not stated otherwise, all results concerns division PPP, 4 lags,
and all exogenous variables included in the model. When results obtained from the
sensitivity analysis are not in line with the ones for the default division PPP and for
4 lags, I provide additional tables summarizing findings from the sensitivity analysis.
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Table 5.2: Graphical illustration of confidence levels in sensitivity-analysis tables
5.1 Greece and Italy
Results for Italy are the most straightforward. The model does not detect con-
tagion at any level between any variables – bonds, stock market index, bank stock
index. Table 5.3 shows that both FR statistics are well below zero, thus any con-
firmation of contagion can be hardly expected. Not only that ρt did not increase
significantly, it actually dropped compared to ρ∗s. Even ρ
∗
t decreased in comparison
to ρ∗s.
Table 5.3: Results for Italian 10Y government bonds
ρ∗s is very high – correlation between the yields was at 0,9. This is in line with
the known fact that yields of sovereign bonds issued by eurozone countries were
converging and moving alike (inter alia, Kocenda et al. (2005), Cote & Graham
(2004). At least this was the case before the Greek sovereign debt crisis. These
results suggest that after the crisis started, correlation between these two countries
dropped much – from 0,900 to 0,143.
A similar situation is on the stock market – see Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. Al-
though FR statistics for both of the examinations – all stocks and bank stocks – are
greater than for the bond yields, contagion could hardly occur. Greater values of
FR statistics suggest that the drop in correlation between the stable and the tur-
moil period was not as large as it was experienced on the bond market. Since there
was fear that contagion could spread through banking sector, one might expect that
values of FR statistics for banking sector would be greater than those for the whole
stock market. Surprisingly, the opposite is true. Both FR statistics for the whole
Italian stock market are greater than those for banks.
As it is assumed, dropping variables and/or changing number of lags has no
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effect whatsoever on the final results. Similarly, alternative sets of periods have no
effect on the verdict.
Table 5.4: Results for the Italian stock market
Table 5.5: Results for Italian bank stocks
Note that the results, indicating that no contagion occurred, are not in a contra-
diction with Italy experiencing hard times during the Greek crisis and the possibility
that the hard times were triggered by the crisis. It may be explained by e.g., inter-
dependence, by similar macro fundamentals, or the wake-up-call effect might occur.
5.2 Greece and Turkey
Results for Greece and Turkey are similar to those for Greece and Italy. There
was not found enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis at any level on any
market. Again, the results are persistent no matter how many lags, which periods,
or how many variables are employed in the model.
For reasons stated in the section 4.1, I cannot estimate contagious effects on
Turkish bonds in division PPP, therefore reported results are based on APP division
– see Table 5.6. I report results on stocks also in APP for the sake of comparability
with the Turkish bond market – see Tables 5.7, and 5.8. Nevertheless, values of
FR statistics for stocks during PPP are very similar to those for APP. In order to
preserve clarity of the text, results based on division PPP are not reported here, but
can be found in Appendix B.
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It should not be surprising that the Turkish ρ∗s for the bond market is much lower
compared to the Italian ρ∗s. Greece and Italy are much more linked together through
the eurozone; moreover, they have many similar macro fundamentals. Turkey has
definitely very different economic development than Greece. For basic illustration:
Turkish GDP shrank only in 2009; in all the following years, it grew. Its debt-to-
GDP ratio has been steadily declining since 2002 with the only exception in 2009.
The ratio is now below 40 %. Unemployment is just below 10 %. Turkey has
experienced very different path after the crisis compared to Greece; global markets
are aware of it, thus ρt dropped so low. It seems that Turkey has been untouched
by the Greek turmoil.
Evidence from the stock market is in compliance with the previous findings.
Again, values of FR statistics for bank stocks are smaller than those for all stocks.
It suggests that Turkish banks were immune against the Greek contagion. Very high
correlation during the stable period almost disappeared after the crisis started.
Table 5.6: Results for Turkish 10Y government bonds for division APP
Table 5.7: Results for the Turkish stock market for division APP
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Table 5.8: Results for Turkish bank stocks for division APP
5.3 Greece and Bulgaria
Firstly, I remind that I analyze only Bulgarian bonds and index for the whole
Bulgarian stock market. There is no Bulgarian bank index. Nevertheless, the lack
of such data should not make any difference, since bank indices exhibit very similar
behavior to those, which represent the whole market. Results for Bulgaria are
presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10.
Contagion is detected on the bond market – both FR statistics reject the null
hypothesis at 5 % level – ρ∗s is negative and ρt is close to zero. So bond yields
between these two countries went from slightly negative correlation to almost none
correlation at all. By the definition, it is surely contagion – the correlation increased,
and increased significantly as the FR statistics indicate. But I hesitate to draw any
strong conclusions from such results. During the crisis period, there was no serious
relationship between the two countries in terms of bond yields, so even the model
detects contagion, ρt is too small to cause any significant effects regarding Bulgarian
bonds. Results based on SOFIX, the Bulgarian stock index, do not provide evidence
of contagion. Bulgarian stocks show small correlation with the Greek ones during
the stable period and the increase in the turmoil period is negligible.
Table 5.9: Results for Bulgarian 10Y government bonds
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Table 5.10: Results for the Bulgarian stock market
Sensitivity analysis does not affect stock market results at all. Actually, FR
statistics depicted in Table 5.10 are the highest among all periods. The analysis for
the bond market is not so straightforward, therefore I provide the sensitivity-analysis
table as described in the beginning of this part. Figures in Table 5.11 represent FR1
statistic. Both statistics give identical verdicts, thus I do not report table for values
of FR2 statistic here. It can be found in Appendix C (Table C.1).
Table 5.11: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for Bulgarian 10Y government
bonds: values for FR1 statistic
The strongest evidence of contagion is found in divisions AAP and AAA. Enough
evidence to confirm contagion at 5 % level among all lags is in divisions PAP and
PAA. Although in division APP, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for 1 lag,
evidence from other lags supports rejection quite strongly. The only two divisions,
where contagion cannot be confirmed, are PPP and PPA, because the evidence
is weak. I can surely confirm contagion for divisions starting from January 2008.
Nevertheless, the real impact is low, since ρt does not exceed value of 0,2 in any of
the divisions. The reason, why divisions starting from 2004 give ambiguous results,
may be in behavior of rate of returns of the Bulgarian bond yields (tBG10) – see
Figure 5.1. The period of 2006-2008 can be hardly defined as stable, the model is
probably influenced by this heavily, thus gives the different conclusions.
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Figure 5.1: Rate of returns of Bulgarian 10Y sovereign bond yields
5.4 Greece and Cyprus
5.4.1 Contagion among stocks
For detecting possible contagion from Greece to Cyprus, I have to rely only on
data from stock markets. Data from the bond market cannot be used for reasons
stated in the section 4.1. The analysis for Cyprus begins on January 11, 2008.
Reasoning for such decision can be also found in the section 4.1.
Cyprus is the only country, where FR statistics do not come to the same verdicts
– see Tables 5.12 and 5.13. The difference is so severe that while FR1 statistic finds
no evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis at 10 % level, FR2 statistic reject it at 1
% level. The different claims are probably caused by values of correlation coefficients.
FR2 statistic, based on Fisher transformation, does not work well with small samples
and with high coefficient values (Dungey et al. 2003). Thus FR1 statistic seems as
a better indicator here, since the values are around 0,9. Nonetheless, an increase in
the coefficients is apparent and given their high values in the stable period, there
was not much space to increase any further.
Table 5.12: Results for the Cypriot stock market for division APP
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Table 5.13: Results for Cypriot bank stocks for division APP
Both FR statistics find no evidence of contagion to the whole stock market in
division AAP, APA, and AAA – see Tables 5.14 and 5.15. Note that values for
periods ending in August 2012 are much higher than those for periods ending in
October 2013 (particularly for FR2 statistic). As stated above, FR2 statistic is not
a good indicator here, thus we should take its values with reserve. Although FR2
statistic claims that contagion occurred in division APP, I consider it as a false
signal. Results for bank stocks are similar to the ones for the whole market and are
reported in Appendix C (Tables C.2 and C.3). I interpret such results as in support
of the idea of no contagion to Cyprus, especially for periods ending in October 2013.
Table 5.14: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for the Cypriot stock market:
values for FR1 statistic
Table 5.15: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for the Cypriot stock market:
values for FR2 statistic
Though the model fails to reliably find contagion to Cyprus, there is a large
potential for spillover effect from Greece to Cyprus. There was enormous correlation
between stock markets prior the crisis: ρ∗s = 0, 886 for the whole stock market and
ρ∗s = 0, 879 for bank stocks. Correlation after the shock even increased: ρt = 0, 927
and ρt = 0, 958 for the whole stock market and bank stocks, respectively. FR
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statistics and ρt are greater for the bank stocks than for the whole market. This
was not the case for the previous countries.
This could be explained by very large exposure of the Cypriot banks to Greece.
Two largest Cypriot banks (as at December 31, 2011), Bank of Cyprus (BC) and
Marfin Popular Bank1 (MFB), which managed more than 70 %2 of the total bank
assets at that time, had the largest exposure to Greece except Greek banks among
all examined banks in the paper by Mink & de Haan (2013). Measured as % of
core tier 1 capital, MFB had 122 % and BC 75 %. To put it into perspective, the
next one was a German bank with 27 % (Mink & de Haan 2013). All of the above
mentioned suggests that the crisis could easily transmit from Greece to Cyprus.
5.4.2 Cross contagion among Greek bonds and Cypriot stocks
Given ambiguous results about contagion to Cyprus, I perform cross-contagion
analysis to acquire more information. Results reported in Tables 5.16, 5.17, and
5.18 show relationship between Cypriot stock indices and Greek government bonds.
Note that negative correlation means that increase in bond yield corresponds with
decrease in value of stock indices. The logic is inverted here, i.e. contagion is
detected, when correlation falls significantly. FR statistics regarding this subsection
are already adjusted to it.
Table 5.16: Results for the Cypriot stock market and Greek bonds for division APP
1today known as Cyprus Popular Bank
2figure acquired from The Banker Database; www.thebankerdatabase.com; the site is sponsored
by The Financial Times Limited
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Table 5.17: Results for Cypriot bank stocks and Greek bonds for division APP
Even though for 4 lags in division APP and APA, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected at 10 % level, and in division AAP the null hypothesis cannot be rejected
at 5 % level, evidence of contagion among the rest of lags is strong – see Table 5.18.
Nevertheless, I cannot confirm contagion in division AAA, because the evidence is
rather weak. Results for the banks are very similar to those for the whole stock
market. Unlike in the former case, FR statistics agree with one another in each
verdict, thus tables, which report results for banks and for the whole stock market
with values for FR2 statistic, can be found in Appendix C (Tables C.4, C.5, and
C.6). Note that the model compares two different instruments, which are traded on
separate markets. This may be the reason, why the verdicts are not unequivocal.
The model may not cover all effects, thus these estimates may be a little inaccurate.
Nevertheless in all cases, ρ∗s is smaller than ρt. 3 out of 4 divisions provide strong
evidence of contagion. Given high correlation among Greek and Cypriot stocks, it
can be drawn that the Greek crisis spread easily to Cyprus and had a large influence
on the whole Cypriot economy.
Table 5.18: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for the Cypriot stock market
and Greek bonds: values for FR1 statistic
5.5 Robustness check
Until now, I have tested for contagion among long periods of time. As stated in
the section 3.1, definition of contagion used by Kaminsky et al. (2003) presumes that
it is a phenomenon occurring during much shorter intervals, than I examine. One
of the reasons, why there is no contagion detected for Italy and Turkey, can be in
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the length of the crisis period. During short turmoil intervals, country-specific (i.e.
idiosyncratic) factors may be suppressed and may have lower influence than during
longer periods of time. In Italy and Turkey, country-specific factors might inhibit
the impact of the Greek crisis more than in Bulgaria and Cyprus. For instance, one
of the factors, which might cover evidence of contagion to Italy and Turkey, may
be the size of economies. When comparing sizes with the Greek economy, as at
December 31, 2008, well before the Greek crisis, the Italian economy was ca. 6,7x
larger, the Turkish one was 3,9x larger; on the opposite side, the Bulgarian one was
3,4 smaller and the Cypriot one was 12,9x smaller. The contagious effects might
have persisted longer in the smaller economies. Nevertheless, in short periods of
time, right after a shock occurs, such factors may not play a role.
To test for this possibility, I define the following stable and the crisis period:
the stable period ranging from April 5, 2010, to May 2, 2010; the crisis one ranging
from May 3, 2010, to June 1, 2010. I choose May 2, 2010, over November 13, 2009,
because the first bailout plan was introduced on May 2, 2010, and shortly after, the
ECB got involved in the crisis for the first time. In November 2009, it might not be
so apparent how severe the crisis would be. Thus I assume that contagious effect
should be stronger after May 2, 2010, than after November 13, 2009.
I have to modify the model slightly. As stated in the section 4.2, the methodology
assumes that during the turmoil periods, volatility is higher. Nonetheless, the period
under examination in this section shows opposite behavior. According to Eser &
Schwaab (2013), volatility on bond markets was lower during periods of the ECB
interventions “due to less extreme (tail) movements occurring when the Eurosystem
is active in the market” (Eser & Schwaab 2013, p.29). Since the SMP was highly
active during May 2010, and was not active during April 2010 at all, volatility during
the turmoil period is lower than during the stable one.
Nothing changes in the construction of δ; the only difference is that I consider
the stable period as the one of high volatility and the turmoil period as the one of
low volatility. The only change made is in the hypotheses and in the definitions of
FR statistics. ρt has been replaced by ρ
∗
t , and similarly ρ
∗
s has been replaced by
ρs. The logic remains the same. I correct for the bias caused by volatility; since
volatility is higher in the stable period, I adjust the coefficient for the stable period,
the coefficient for the turmoil period can be left unadjusted.
Due to the length of the examined periods, it was possible to employ only 1 lag in
the model. The critical values stated in Table 5.1 are not applicable for FR1 statistic,
since there is a low number of observations, and FR1 follows t-distribution. Verdicts
reported in tables below do respect critical values for t-distribution; nevertheless,
since the differences with Table 5.1 are minimal3, I do not report the critical values in
3the maximal difference is 0,115; mean value of differences is 0,057 and median is 0,042
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the thesis. As stated in the subsection 5.4.1, FR2 statistic is not a good indicator,
when the sample is small. Thus if FR2 statistic indicates differently than FR1
statistic, I will follow the verdict of FR1 statistic.
5.5.1 Greece and Italy
Contagion is detected only for the all-stock index. The model does not reveal
an existence of contagion in the bond market nor for the bank stock index – see
Tables 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21. Unlike in the longer periods, the drop in correlation
for the bond yields is not so dramatic. ρ∗t remained quite high suggesting strong
interdependence between the bond markets. No evidence of contagion among the
bond yields during May 2010 may be explained by different impacts of the SMP on
the Greek bonds and on the Italian ones. According to Eser & Schwaab (2013), the
impact of the SMP on the Italian yields was ca. “-1 to -2 basis points and up to -17
to -21 basis points (Greece) at a five-year maturity per e1 bn of purchases across
euro area countries” (Eser & Schwaab 2013, p.29).
In Table 5.20, FR statistics do not come to the same conclusion at 1 % level, so
contagion can be confirmed on 5 % level only. Results for the whole stock market
suggest that before the break point, correlation was rather mild; on the other hand
bank stock indices exhibited quite strong correlation even during the stable period.
The bank stocks did not respond to the shock as much as the whole market. The
model suggests that no contagion occurred among the bank stocks. This goes along
with the finding in the section 5.1, where FR statistics for the bank stocks are smaller
than those for the whole stock market. Still, ρ∗t is quite high in all three examined
sectors, revealing that interdependence between Greece and Italy was strong.
Table 5.19: Results for Italian 10Y government bonds
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Table 5.20: Results for the Italian stock market
Table 5.21: Results for Italian bank stocks
5.5.2 Greece and Turkey
ρ∗t is higher than ρs in all cases for Turkey – see Tables 5.22, 5.23, and 5.24.
Nonetheless, contagion can be confirmed at 10 % level only for the whole stock
market. Though the increase for the bank stocks is quite large, given small sample
size, it is not statistically significant. FR statistics for the bank stocks are smaller
than the ones for the whole stock market; this is in line with the previous finding in
the section 5.2. Unlike of those findings, there was strong interdependence among
the stocks. So even though the bank stocks did not experience contagion, they were
affected quite heavily by the Greek crisis.
Table 5.22: Results for Turkish 10Y government bonds
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Table 5.23: Results for the Turkish stock market
Table 5.24: Results for Turkish bank stocks
5.5.3 Greece and Bulgaria
Similarly to the results based on longer periods, evidence of contagion is found
only on the bond market. Again, any real impact on the Bulgarian economy seems
negligible given ρ∗t = 0, 009. Though contagion was detected, results indicate that
Bulgaria was quite isolated from the Greek economy; it has the lowest values of
correlation coefficients among all the examined countries.
Table 5.25: Results for Bulgarian 10Y government bonds
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Table 5.26: Results for the Bulgarian stock market
5.5.4 Greece and Cyprus
Even though no contagion was detected to Cyprus, results are quite consistent
with the ones for the longer periods. Increase4 of correlation is apparent in all sectors.
Again, correlation between stock markets is extremely high; and FR statistics are
higher for the bank stocks (disregarding FR2 statistic for reasons stated above –
small sample size, high coefficient values). Results on cross contagion show that
correlation coefficients almost doubled after the break point, though due to the
small sample size, it is not enough to reject the null hypothesis.
Table 5.27: Results for the Cypriot stock market
Table 5.28: Results for Cypriot bank stocks
4indeed for results on cross contagion, I mean increase of negative correlation
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Table 5.29: Results for the Cypriot stock market and Greek bonds
Table 5.30: Results for Cypriot bank stocks and Greek bonds
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Contagion was detected on the Bulgarian bond market during November 2009 –
October 2013. In the same period, contagion from the Greek bonds was affecting the
Cypriot stocks. I found evidence of contagion to Italy and Turkey on the whole stock
market during May 2010. In all other cases, the model failed to find any contagion.
Detected contagion was rather an isolated phenomenon affecting individual markets
in very specific periods. No examined country experienced contagion on its bond
and its stock market simultaneously. Nevertheless, I must reject my first hypothesis;
contagion was present in all the examined countries.
I cannot reject the hypothesis that contagion was stronger among the eurozone
countries. While the Bulgarian bond market experienced contagion from Greece,
the Italian one revealed no traces of contagion. Turkish bank stock index exhibited
stronger response to the Greek crisis during May 2010 than the Italian one. In all
other cases, the Turkish stock market behaved quite similarly as the Italian one in
relation to the Greek stock market. Nevertheless, the eurozone countries were much
more interdependent with Greece than Bulgaria and Turkey. Correlation between
the Bulgarian and the Greek bond market did not exceed value of 0,2. Correla-
tion between Cypriot and Greek stocks was during turmoil periods well beyond 0,9.
Bond markets between Italy and Greece in May 2010 showed correlation of value
0,7. So even though, I cannot reject that contagion was stronger among the euro-
zone countries, it is evident that linkages among Italy and Cyprus on the one hand
and Greece on the other hand were stronger than those, which Greece had with Bul-
garia and Turkey. Spillovers from Greece could spread easily to Italy and Cyprus.
This suggests that the eurozone countries might experience larger negative shocks
triggered by the Greek crisis.
I reject the hypothesis that contagion occurred only in the financial sector. For
Italy and Turkey in May 2010, contagion was detected on the whole stock market,
while among the bank stocks was not detected. The analysis shows that correlation
among bank stocks was smaller than the one among the whole markets. The only
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exception is Cyprus during May 2010 – August 2012, though the difference is small.
Even though that there exists the evidence of contagion, it is noticeable that
investors distinguished between the countries very well during the crisis in the long
perspective. Many correlation coefficients for stable periods had been very high,
but after the turmoil period began, the coefficients dropped dramatically. It applies
mainly for Italy and Turkey.
Bibliography
Aloui, R., Aissa, M. S. B. & Nguyen, D. K. (2011), ‘Global financial crisis, extreme
interdependences, and contagion effects: The role of economic structure?’, Journal
of Banking & Finance 35(1), 130–141.
Arghyrou, M. G. & Kontonikas, A. (2011), The emu sovereign-debt crisis: Fun-
damentals, expectations and contagion, European Economy - Economic Papers
436, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European
Commission.
Bhanot, K., Burns, N., Hunter, D. & Williams, M. (2012), ‘Was there contagion in
eurozone sovereign bond markets during the greek debt crisis?’, The University
of Texas at San Antonio Working Paper Series 006FIN-73-2012 .
Bouvet, F., Brady, R. & King, S. (2013), Debt contagion in europe: A panel-var
analysis, Departmental Working Papers 44, United States Naval Academy De-
partment of Economics.
CBOE (2015), ‘Cboe volatility index R© (vix R©)’, [Online] Available from:
http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx. [Accesed on 30.5.2015].
Claeys, P. & Vasicek, B. (2014), Measuring bilateral spillover and testing conta-
gion on sovereign bond markets in europe, Working Paper Series 1666, European
Central Bank.
Cote, D. & Graham, C. (2004), Convergence of government bond yields in the euro
zone: The role of policy harmonization, Working Papers 04-23, Bank of Canada.
Dungey, M., Fry, R., Gonzalez-Hermosillo, B. & Martin, V. (2003), Unanticipated
shocks and systemic influences; the impact of contagion in global equity markets
in 1998, IMF Working Papers 03/84, International Monetary Fund.
Engle, R. (2002), ‘Dynamic conditional correlation: A simple class of multivari-
ate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity models’, Journal of
Business & Economic Statistics 20(3), 339–50.
43
BIBLIOGRAPHY 44
Eser, F. & Schwaab, B. (2013), Assessing asset purchases within the ecb’s securities
markets programme, Working Paper Series 1587, European Central Bank.
Favero, C. A. & Giavazzi, F. (2002), ‘Is the international propagation of financial
shocks non-linear? evidence from the erm’, Journal of International Economics
57(1), 231–246.
Forbes, K. J. & Rigobon, R. (2002), ‘No contagion, only interdependence: Measuring
stock market comovements’, Journal of Finance 57(5), 2223–2261.
Gomez-Puig, M. & Sosvilla-Rivero, S. (2014), ‘Causality and contagion in emu
sovereign debt markets’, International Review of Economics & Finance 33(C), 12–
27.
Gorea, D. & Radev, D. (2014), ‘The euro area sovereign debt crisis: Can contagion
spread from the periphery to the core?’, International Review of Economics &
Finance 30(C), 78–100.
Grammatikos, T. & Vermeulen, R. (2012), ‘Transmission of the financial and
sovereign debt crises to the emu: Stock prices, cds spreads and exchange rates’,
Journal of International Money and Finance 31(3), 517–533.
Kalbaska, A. & Gatkowski, M. (2012), ‘Eurozone sovereign contagion: Evidence
from the cds market (2005 - 2010)’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
83(3), 657–673.
Kaminsky, G. L., Reinhart, C. & Vegh, C. A. (2003), The unholy trinity of financial
contagion, NBER Working Papers 10061, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc.
Kocenda, E., Kutan, A. M. & Yigit, T. M. (2005), Pilgrims to the eurozone: How far,
how fast?, CERGE-EI Working Papers wp279, The Center for Economic Research
and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
Mink, M. & de Haan, J. (2013), ‘Contagion during the greek sovereign debt crisis’,
Journal of International Money and Finance 34(C), 102–113.
Pais, A. & Stork, P. A. (2011), ‘Contagion risk in the australian banking and prop-
erty sectors’, Journal of Banking & Finance 35(3), 681–697.
Panico, C. & Purificato, F. (2013), The debt crisis and the european central bank’s
role of lender of last resort, Working Papers wp306, Political Economy Research
Institute, University of Massachusetts at Amherst.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 45
Pechova, L. (2010), Stock markets contagion in the western and central european
region during subprime crisis, Master’s thesis, Charles University in Prague, Fac-
ulty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies.
URL: https://is.cuni.cz/webapps/zzp/download/120013244/?lang=en
Pericoli, M. & Sbracia, M. (2001), A primer on financial contagion, Temi di dis-
cussione (Economic working papers) 407, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and
International Relations Area.
Philippas, D. & Siriopoulos, C. (2013), ‘Putting the c into crisis: Contagion, cor-
relations and copulas on emu bond markets’, Journal of International Financial
Markets, Institutions and Money 27(C), 161–176.
Pragidis, I. & Chionis, D. (2014), Are there any contagion effects from greek bonds?,
DUTH Research Papers in Economics 6-2014, Democritus University of Thrace,
Department of Economics.
Rocco, M. (2011), Extreme value theory for finance: a survey, Questioni di Econo-
mia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 99, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and
International Relations Area.
Samitas, A. & Tsakalos, I. (2013), ‘How can a small country affect the european
economy? the greek contagion phenomenon’, Journal of International Financial
Markets, Institutions and Money 25(C), 18–32.
Stove, B., Tjostheim, D. & Hufthammer, K. O. (2014), ‘Using local gaussian corre-
lation in a nonlinear re-examination of financial contagion’, Journal of Empirical
Finance 25(C), 62–82.
the ECB (2015), ‘All glossary entries’, [Online] Available from:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/glossary/html/glosse.en.html#189. [Accesed
on 30.5.2015].
Trebesch, C. & Zettelmeyer, J. (2014), Ecb interventions in distressed sovereign debt
markets: The case of greek bonds, CESifo Working Paper Series 4731, CESifo
Group Munich.
Appendix A
Graphical illustration of variables
The depicted data are adjusted by two-day moving average, and non-trading
dates are removed. The key in naming of the variables is following: the core of the
name consists of two letters BG, CY, GR, IT, or TR and denotes the country of
the origin of such data. BG for Bulgaria, CY for Cyprus, GR for Greece, IT for
Italy, and TR for Turkey. Prefix “t” denotes transformed data of the variables as it
is described by the formula (4.1). Prefix “s” denotes data for short-term interest
rates. Suffixes “10”, “x”, and “banks” denotes data for 10Y sovereign bonds, whole
stock market indices, and bank stock indices, respectively. VIX denotes data on
VIX. For instance, tITx represents transformed data on the Italian stock market.
Figure A.1: GR10 Figure A.2: BG10 Figure A.3: CY10
Figure A.4: IT10 Figure A.5: TR10 Figure A.6: GRx
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Figure A.7: BGx Figure A.8: CYx Figure A.9: ITx
Figure A.10: TRx Figure A.11: GRbanks Figure A.12: CYbanks
Figure A.13: ITbanks Figure A.14: TRbanks Figure A.15: sGR
Figure A.16: sUS Figure A.17: sBG Figure A.18: sTR
Figure A.19: VIX
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Figure A.20: tGR10 Figure A.21: tBG10
Figure A.22: tCY10
Figure A.23: tIT10 Figure A.24: tTR10 Figure A.25: tGRx
Figure A.26: tBGx Figure A.27: tCYx Figure A.28: tITx
Figure A.29: tTRx Figure A.30: tGRbanks Figure A.31: tCYbanks
Figure A.32: tITbanks Figure A.33: tTRbanks Figure A.34: tsGR
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Figure A.35: tsUS Figure A.36: tsBG Figure A.37: tsTR
Figure A.38: tVIX
Appendix B
Additional tables – Turkey
Additional information for the section 5.2.
Table B.1: Results for the Turkish stock market for division PPP
Table B.2: Results for Turkish bank stocks for division PPP
50
Appendix C
Additional tables – sensitivity
analysis
Table C.1: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for Bulgarian 10Y government
bonds: values for FR2 statistic
Table C.2: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for Cypriot bank stocks: values
for FR1 statistic
Table C.3: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for Cypriot bank stocks: values
for FR2 statistic
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Table C.4: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for Cypriot bank stocks and
Greek bonds: values for FR1 statistic
Table C.5: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for Cypriot bank stocks and
Greek bonds: values for FR2 statistic
Table C.6: Results based on the sensitivity analysis for the Cypriot stock market
and Greek bonds: values for FR2 statistic
